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In November 1941, South Africa suffered a crushing blow. The same month that her 
forces had mopped up a motley crew of Italians in East Africa, they suddenly had to 
face a resolute German army in North Africa under the formidable Erwin Rommel. 
During fierce fighting on 22 and 23 November, the 5th SA Infantry Brigade was 
overrun and annihilated by a German armoured assault at Sidi Rezegh, a battle 
described as the largest and most violent tank battle of the North African campaign. 
Rommel counterattacked and outflanked the Allied forces from the west. At 7:30 a.m. 
on the morning of November 22 his panzers knifed through the brigade, cutting it off 
from the rest of the 7th UK Armoured Division. The carnage was terrible. The 
Brigade had gone into battle 5 700 strong; when the survivors assembled at Mersa 
Matruh only 2 306 were left. Over 600 were killed or wounded and the rest had been 
captured.1 
 
Such “lessons” are often cast dramatically by “first battles”, a term adopted 
by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft to explain that first engagement in a war 
when the strengths and weaknesses of an army’s peacetime preparation, doctrinal 
development and force design, as well as the mobilisation for the war itself, are 
tested by the exigencies of conflict and are found either to be good or in demand 
of urgent, wartime adjustment.2 Sidi Rezegh was, in many ways, a first-battle 
experience for the Union Defence Force. The “lessons” were expensive and 
highlight poor peace-time planning and preparation, and a military leadership 
affected by little training and no real experience, issues addressed in a report on 
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down with gum – they won’t move and they won’t turn their artillery round and they are not dug 
in – I am sorry for them.” Larmuth, quoting Gott, see J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton and L.C.F. Turner, 
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the military position in South Africa on 7 September 1939. The circumstances 
sketched in this report were the result of long term neglect, the gradual whittling 
away of military intellect and real military leadership, and the appointment of 
managers and the politically-willing, who push messages rather than getting to 
grips with strategy, military theory, military history and other time-consuming, 
challenging pursuits.3 But then South Africa was not unique in this respect. Armed 
forces around the globe failed to innovate because, as Williamson Murray has 
noted, the interwar years were marked by stringent military budgets and a distrust 
of military institutions, which were confronted simultaneously by a range of 
technological, tactical, operational and strategic challenges, and all were moreover 
clouded by the murky “lessons” of the First World War.4 
 
This paper aims to do three things essentially.5 It will attempt firstly, to 
sketch, in broad brush strokes the political-strategic framework within which the 
Union Defence Force and its predecessors had to function between 1900 and 
1940. Secondly, the organisational and extraneous factors that affected the 
functioning and influenced the preparations of the Union Defence Forces will be 
set out. Thirdly, the doctrinal framework, including an assessment of the services’ 
commitment to the problem of doctrine and of their rigour in drawing, learning and 
implementing the so-called “lessons” of the First World War, will be explored. It will 
therefore address the South African reaction to the brutality and high costs of 
industrialised warfare and explain the attempts, apparently always feeble, by the 
South African state to adapt to the changing face of modern warfare. It will also 
address the matter of force design and attempt to answer the question of why the 
Union Defence Force, after the experience at Delville Wood (July 1916) especially, 
was still so unprepared for European warfare in 1941. 
 
South Africa’s politico-strategic environment 
 
Any investigation of the causes for the poor military condition in 1939 goes back to 
the turn of the century, when South Africa was still a geographic expression for an 
assortment of British colonies, former Boer republics and a number of recently-
conquered African kingdoms and chiefdoms. The ending of the Second Anglo-Boer 
War (1899–1902) ushered in a new era for southern Africa, one of undoubted British 
supremacy. Yet Pax Britannica was no panacea for a troubled region. Several 
strategic problems, some of which were new, vexed. The worst, but least likely 
contingency, never constant and seldom real, was a war between Britain and an 
imperial power and particularly one opposing Britain in Africa. If the enemy was 
Germany or Portugal, the war would probably include an overland invasion from 
South West Africa (Namibia) or Mozambique, the firing of an Afrikaner rebellion and, 
in the case of Germany, a limited naval campaign in the Southern Oceans. A war 
with France or Belgium would involve the same problems less the landward invasion, 
but with the possible addition of an African rising. South Africa differed from the 
                                                 
3.  National Archives of South Africa, Pretoria (hereafter NASAP): A.1, Field Marshal J.C. 
Smuts Papers, vol. 132, “Statement of the Local Military Position on 7 September 1939 and 
steps taken thereafter”.  
4.  W. Murray, “Armoured Warfare: The British, French, and German Experiences”, in W. 
Murray and A.R. Millett, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1998), p 8. 
5  This framework is suggested by Murray and Millett, Military Innovation in the Interwar 
Period, pp 1–5. 
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other self-governing dominions, for she had European powers within marching 
distant of her land boundaries and with easy access to her ports. The Royal Navy 
presence at Simonstown, a second-class naval base, was both a consolation as 
well as a political conundrum.6 
 
Plans were drawn up by the imperial authorities and the colonial 
administrations in the four British colonies in South Africa to counter the 
eventualities; they were coded alphabetically, Plan Z being a lightning strike 
against the Portuguese in Lourenço Marques.7 Yet, except for minor operations 
within the borders of British South Africa,8 the imperial defence authorities knew 
they did not have sufficient troops and so, from 1902 until 1912, they turned their 
attention to the creation of a manpower mobilisation system that reconciled 
projected wartime force estimates with the often whimsical, seldom extravagant 
notions of British imperial and South African politicians, administrators and 
officials. 
 
The answer was found momentarily in finding a balance between the 
declining number of imperial troops and the fostering of volunteer organisations in 
the colonies. A fundamental overhauling of military policy, it was hoped, would 
create a geography of loyalism on the Highveld.9 British settlers, encouraged by 
rumoured native risings, rushed to the colours. The Boers, defeated in 1902 and 
disarmed briefly, were courted and encouraged and many enlisted, although they 
joined the British-style volunteer regiments for reasons of rural insecurity rather 
than any feeling of loyalty to the British crown. Although momentarily mollified by 
the promise of better rural security, Afrikaner republicans vacated the volunteer 
regiments from 1907 and enlisted in the resurrected commandos. 
 
The Zulu rebellion that erupted in Natal in 1906, which bears Bhambatha’s 
name, highlighted several weaknesses in colonial defence planning and so 
sparked military co-operation and furthered military thinking.10 Spurred on by the 
initial successes achieved by Bhambatha, the troops in South Africa, both imperial 
and colonial, underwent training in asymmetrical warfare. A pamphlet on Savage 
Warfare, written by Colonel (later Major General Sir) H.T. Lukin and published in 
May 1906,11 was studied and practised in the field, although not without some 
                                                 
6.  Military Archives, SANDF Documentation Centre, Pretoria: Diverse, Box 15, file 199, Colonial 
Defence Committee Memoranda on General Defence Matters, Bourne to Smuts, 8 
September 1910; and Smuts to Bourne, 20 September 1910.  
7.  SANDF Documentation Centre, Pretoria: Archives of the Secretary for Defence (hereafter 
DC), Box 356, DC40057, Intelligence Section Secret report from Major J.G.W. Leipoldt to the 
Adjutant General, 22 December 1917. See also SADF Documentation Centre: Union War 
Histories, Box 339, Miss Pope-Hennessy, “Z Plan Narrative”, 1949.  
8.  These were the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and of Natal as well as the two former 
Boer republics that had been incorporated into the British Empire in 1900 as the Transvaal 
Colony and the Orange River Colony. 
9.  The term “geography of loyalism” is adopted from K. Linch, “A Geography of Loyalism? 
The Local Military Forces of the West Riding of Yorkshire, 1794–1814”, War & Society, 19, 
1, May 2001, p 2. 
10.  See, for example, Lt Col H.A. Wyndham, “Some Aspects of South African Defence”, The 
State, 2, 6, June 1909; and Major P.A. Silburn, The Colonies and Imperial Defence 
(Longmans, London, 1909). 
11.  H.T. Lukin, Savage Warfare: Hints on Tactics to be Adopted and Precautions to be Taken 
(Cape Times Ltd, Cape Town, 1906). See also National Archives of South Africa, Cape 
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opposition. The commander of the Southern Mounted Rifles, who may well have 
preferred a breastplate in the Life Guards, complained of the “dullness” of savage-
warfare practices.12 Nonetheless, the colonial defence authorities reconsidered the 
adequacy of their organisations and training and the first steps were taken leading to 
the reduction of overlapping, the facilitation of co-operation and economy, and 
leading perhaps to a situation where the imperial government might even “have a call 
on some proportion” of the force in the case of an international emergency.13 
 
South Africa’s military forces, at the start of our period colonial and varied, 
existed between 1900 and 1939 on a political landscape that was apt to change 
rapidly and dramatically. Several, interrelated factors shaped this environment. First 
and foremost, was the military geography of South Africa and her relatively isolated 
position at the southern end of the African continent, seemingly distant from the 
discord of Europe and Asia. Moreover, South Africans presumed that in the event of 
war, the enemy would be distant from the bases of his supply and that the Royal 
Navy, with a base at Simonstown until 1955, would counter any seaborne threat, 
while the British Army command, in Cape Town until 1921, would assist local forces 
in repelling a land-based enemy that would, in any case, have to cross difficult 
country, a vast desert in the west and malarial jungle in the east. South Africa had at 
this point in Britain and her Empire not simply an ally, but a professed protector that 
was then the world superpower. 
 
Second, South Africa had her own fault-lines, which were immediately 
susceptible to the grinding of geopolitical fault-lines in Europe.14 The presence of a 
German colonial army in Namibia and warmth between them and a significant 
number of Afrikaners, cast this into dramatic relief. There was an almost natural 
gravitation of Afrikaners, particularly the nationalists of the former republics, to 
these Germans, who were more alike in stock and had assisted the Boer republics 
in their war against the British Empire. This had been a total war, one that cast 
long, historical shadows, and, although the military conflict ended in 1902, for 
many Afrikaners, brought unwillingly into the British fold, their struggle against “the 
English” ended only in 1961 when South Africa withdrew from the British 
Commonwealth of Nations.15 In 1914, Britain’s claim to protect small nations 
seemed dubious to many South Africans. Moreover, from 1902, the likelihood of 
an international war between the great powers was increasing. Imperial rivalries 
around the world, particularly in Africa and the competition for resources 
necessary to fuel European industry and manufacture the weapons of 
industrialised warfare, threatened to make the next war both global and expensive. 
The shifting of European tectonic plates impacted on South Africa, despite her 
relative geographic isolation and apparent strategic safety. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Town (hereafter NASAC): CO 8310, file X5114, “Savage Warfare”; P. Truter to Col Lukin, 
10 May 1906.  
12.  West Sussex Record Office (hereafter WSRO): Petworth House Archives (hereafter PHA), 
uncatalogued letters of H.A. Wyndham, Lt Col Hon Hugh Wyndham to Lady Leconfield, 27 
August 1906.  
13.  Milner to Colonel Charles Crewe, 27 April 1904, in C. Headlam (ed.), Milner Papers: South 
Africa, Volume 2, 1899–1905 (Cassell & Co, London, 1933), p 508. 
14.  N. Ferguson, The War of the World; History’s Age of Hatred (Penguin, London, 2007), 
chapter 3. 
15.  O. Geyser, Watershed for South Africa, London 1961 (Butterworths, Durban and Pretoria 
1983). 
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Third, was an almost constant antimilitary sentiment, particularly though not 
exclusively among Afrikaners, who remained for much of the twentieth century 
distrustful of the British and of British institutions and baulked at the military 
institutions the British created. Many Britons misread the situation quite entirely; 
“the backveld Boer”, Maud Wyndham informed her father, “likes to sit on his stoep 
in safety & see the English soldiers standing guard & buying their produce”.16 But 
this was an antimilitarism of a peculiarly anti-British nature that permeated the 
collective mind of a people fashioned by the traditions of small wars and irregular 
commandos and determined to regain lost independence. Afrikaner domination of 
the South African political establishment virtually ensured that compulsory 
peacetime military training, along British lines at least, would not be adopted. Olive 
Schreiner, the writer of The Story of an African Farm, well-captures the geographic 
consideration and antimilitarism: 
 
‘I seem to have lived in a bath of human blood ever since I can remember! The only 
thing we need such a defense (sic) force for, is to kill other South Africans. Our 
position, the nature of our country, the distance from its real base of supplies of any 
attacking country – even Germany – makes us perfectly safe if we are united.’17 
 
However, this unity as South Africans depended on the development of a 
local, South African nationalism, something seemingly undermined by the “British 
connection”, which constitutes a third factor. Knowing how tenuous their hold on 
South Africa was after 1902 and recognising the potential for future challenge, the 
British courted the Afrikaners, granting self-government within the empire to the 
former Boer republics and then, encouraged by economic and defence 
considerations, facilitated the political union in 1910 of the four colonies of the Cape, 
Natal, Transvaal and Orange River. The Union of South Africa came into being on 
31 May 1910 and the Afrikaners, lead by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts, swept to 
power that September, winning a majority of seats in an election that was 
disposed towards the rural constituencies. The Unionists, the British oriented 
party, were only strong on the Witwatersrand and in the large cities of the Cape 
Province. Natal went to local independents. The forging of a new South African 
society was built on a consensus that the sectarian interests of the English and 
Afrikaans communities had to be finely balanced, and the “happiness” of their 
subject peoples carefully managed.18 
 
Military necessity had encouraged political union. The threat of native risings, 
and the Bhambatha revolt in Natal in 1906, had first led to defence talks between 
the staffs of the four colonies. Bhambatha, although suppressed easily, revealed 
all the flaws of South African colonial defence policy and the institutional 
weaknesses of the colonial militias. Greater inter-colonial military cooperation had 
followed and after a sequence of military conferences a platform for the creation of 
                                                 
16.  Hagley Hall Archives (hereafter HHA): 2/34/13, Maud Wyndham to Lord Cobham, 19 
February 1912. 
17.  University of Cape Town Libraries, Archives and Manuscripts (hereafter UCT): BC294, 
Duncan Collection, D1.33.2, Olive Schreiner to Patrick Duncan, 27 June 1912. 
18.  J. Lambert, “South African British? Or Dominion South Africans? The Evolution of an 
Identity in the 1910s and 1920s”, South African Historical Journal, 43, November 2000, 
especially p 197; J. Lambert, ‘An Identity Threatened: White English-speaking South 
Africans, Britishness and Domestic South Africanism, 1934–1939”, Kleio, 37, 2005, p 59. 
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a regional military force, which became the Union Defence Forces in July 1912, 
was established.19 
 
But the creation of the Union Defence Forces (UDF) was no easy matter. 
Jan Smuts, an eager defence minister, had to move cautiously to avoid any 
“appearance of compulsion or militarism on the European model”.20 M.T. Steyn, 
the former president of the Orange Free State, for example, remained concerned 
that the new force, and the school cadet system especially, would create a spirit of 
militarism and that the lines between the imperial forces and the Union forces 
would be blurred. The Afrikaners were not alone. John X. Merriman, Cape 
politician and elder statesman, was concerned that South Africa “not be led into 
militarism and to any unwise pledges of sharing in the quarrels in [the] inciting [of] 
which we have not been consulted”.21 His vision for a small force, having good 
organisation and excellent supply, but with “not too much discipline”, was 
countered by the Unionists. The Unionists demanded a force not only sufficient for 
internal defence, but able also, in concert possibly with British forces, to repel the 
attack of a European enemy possibly elsewhere in British Africa. 
 
Opposing his own party, Smuts introduced the South Africa defence bill in 
February 1912. An avalanche of criticism and high levels of discontent in the 
country districts of particularly the Transvaal followed.22 There remained, as Hugh 
Wyndham noted, “a great deal of suspicion of its provisions amongst the old 
fashioned Boer population” and mostly regarding the principle of compulsory 
training.23 Petitions were considered, the Military Code and Rules of Procedure as 
provisionally adopted from the British Army Act were consulted, and in the face of 
severe opposition the bill was adopted in April 1912.24 As a party, only the 
Unionists were satisfied, for the bill stressed the importance of defence as an 
imperial matter.25 However, this legislation contained the seed of its own near 
destruction. “South Africa”, as used in the Act, was a geographic expression, left 
purposely undefined by Smuts, although he had assured the governor-general that 
‘it would surely cover any part of the continent of Africa south of the equator”.26 
However inadequate the UDF was, it represented a fundamental change in South 
African military policy. The Defence Act recognised a dependence on the Royal 
                                                 
19.  These conferences were convened, in Pretoria, Durban, and Johannesburg, and were 
followed by the Imperial Conferences of 1909 and 1911. Debatten van de Volksraad, 21 
February  1911, cols 1263–66. See also, War Office Documents, A1380, South African 
Defence. 
20.  Rhodes House, Oxford (hereafter RHO): Sir Herbert James Stanley Papers, MSS Afr 
s.1250, Herbert Stanley to Lord Gladstone, 7 August 1910. Kent Fedorowich is thanked for 
this reference. 
21.  J.X. Merriman to M.T. Steyn, 16 January 1911, in A.H. Marais (ed.), Politieke Briewe, II: 
1911–1912 (Tafelberg, Bloemfontein, 1973), p 5. 
22.  NASAP: Beyers Collection, col 1, ff. 45–47, M.T. Steyn to C.F. Beyers, 16 February 1912. 
See also the two petitions, Memorial of the Women of Nooitgedacht, undated (ff.104–107), 
and Memorial of the Women of Randjesfontein, undated (ff.108–110). 
23.  WSRO: PHA, Hugh Wyndham to Lady Leconfield, 21 February and 27 February 1912.  
24.  Union of South Africa, Parliament, Select Committee Report: S.C.7-1912. On South African 
Defence Bill, see report, J.C. Smuts, 16 April 1912. 
25.  RHO: Feetham Papers, Box 3, file 1, folio 134, Richard Feetham to his mother, 19 April 
1912.  
26.  Smuts did not consider the term “South Africa” in any way limited by the Act of Union. 
SANDF Documentation Centre, Pretoria: DC, Box 47, file 1063, South African Defence Bill, 
Smuts to Lord Gladstone, 16 November 1911. 
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Navy to protect South Africa from foreign invasion and there were now coastal 
defences backed by military forces on the interior. But few thought the UDF would 
undertake military tasks beyond “South Africa”, and so the UDF remained 
essentially a colonial constabulary and coast-defence organisation with few 
sharing Smuts’ vision for a more balanced, modern force, capable of engaging a 
modern enemy. 
 
The Union Defence Force and the politics of military integration 
 
Like the Union of South Africa, the UDF was a compromise between the 
determination of English-speakers to maintain the “British connection” and the 
desire of Afrikaner nationalists for a restoration of Boer political and military 
traditions. It was self-evident – despite the appeals of Olive Schreiner and others – 
that the new South African state founded in 1910 was to be a militaristic if not well 
armed society. The Union Defence Forces was thought by politicians across party 
lines to be both natural and inevitable. But it was less evident how exactly 
members of four disparate forces, representing at least three military traditions, 
and speaking and protecting two languages, were to combine into the defence 
structures.  
 
This conundrum faced Smuts, who, like his early rivals, J.B.M. Hertzog and 
C.F. Beyers, had seen service in the Boer armies, when they had commanded 
fronts and planned strategy against the British. Smuts, who recognised that the 
future of the UDF lay not in the re-creation of the Boer forces or in the sole efforts 
of former Boer commanders, appreciated the need for a modern defence force 
based on Western methods. He was undoubtedly the overwhelming influence 
behind the UDF and relied, at times heavily, upon carefully selected staff officers, 
of whom the foremost, Tim Lukin, Roland Bourne, and Jack Collyer, were his 
former enemies. Always expedient, Smuts recruited talent, well-trained, 
experienced, battle-hardened, even if they came from former colonial or British 
regiments.27 But this and Smuts’ easy erudition was not well-received in the 
backveld.28 
 
In the face of severe Afrikaner opposition, the Union Defence Forces (UDF) 
were established with effect from 1 July 1912. The Union Defence Forces, which 
drew in structures from the four former colonies29, was itself a combination of six 
forces – the SA Permanent Force (SAPF), the Active Citizen Force (ACF), the 
Coast Garrison Force (CGF), the Rifle Associations (or resurrected Commandos), 
the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), and the Cadet Corps. The UDF, in 
                                                 
27.  Field Marshal Lord Methuen and his chief of staff, Brigadier General George Aston, were 
also consulted and, at Smuts’ request, both men remained in South Africa until the 
passage of the bill through the South African parliament. SANDF Documentation Centre, 
Pretoria: DC, Box 47, file 1063, South Africa Defence Bill. 
28.  William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand (hereafter Wits): Archives of the 
Church of the Province of South Africa, AB186, Archbishop Carter Letters, William Carter 
to Algernon Lawley, 3 August 1919, The term “backveld” was used by the English South 
Africans to refer to “the rolling countryside of the two old republics”. See A.G. Barlow, That 
We May Tread Safely (Tafelberg, Cape Town, 1960), p 66. Barlow’s definition, however, 
does not suggest the pejorative meaning that the term conveyed. 
29.  These were the Cape Colonial Forces, the Transvaal Volunteers and the Natal Militia, as 
well some former members of the South African Constabulary, a paramilitary police force 
for the Transvaal and Orange River colonies. 
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terms of the Defence Act, was created for the defence of “South Africa” and it 
encompassed the traditional cornerstones of South African military policy, namely, 
citizen soldiers, a small permanent force, a small local division of the Royal Naval 
Volunteer Reserve, which was stationed at the major ports only, and very thinly-
spread coastal fortifications. However, several factors affected the Union Defence 
Forces and undermined its standing as a reliable, well-equipped, and deployable 
defence force. 
 
Firstly, there was the matter of military culture. Complex dynamics, 
embracing personal prejudice as much as the demands of modern warfare and the 
requirement of imperial standardisation, shaped South African defence policy and 
the formation of the Union Defence Forces. However, the UDF remained an 
unhappy marriage between the British and Boer military value systems. A Defence 
Council, essentially a safety mechanism for the protection of language interests, was 
created.30 But many Afrikaners could not endure “the melting pot” of the new Union 
Defence Forces, and appealed to old patrons for personal support or, eventually, 
followed them into rebellion in 1914.31 Several explanations, chiefly from the 
Afrikaner nationalist perspective, have been provided for the alleged heavy British 
imprint on the Union Defence Forces. These range from the length of Britain’s 
presence in southern Africa and her pre-eminent position after 1902, to the 
blaming of Smuts and Botha for their abandonment of the volk and their embracing 
of empire.32 Yet, while each of these explanations has merit, they remain, even 
collectively, inadequate. Historians generally have not assessed the role of the 
individuals behind the establishment of the UDF, the nature of that force, and the 
specific purposes for which it was designed. The UDF was a consensus, a product 
of a combination of systems, but nonetheless a thoughtful combination, one 
(hopefully) of “proper conception”.33 
 
Second was the apparent need, even at the cost of military effectiveness, to 
balance language and sectarian interests. This is evident from the start. The 
parliamentary select committee for defence, to which the bill was referred in March 
1912, comprised nine members (four Afrikaners and five English-speakers) with a 
political division of four Unionists, four members of the “Dutch” party, and one 
                                                 
30.  There were four defence councillors, two English and two Afrikaans, and representing the four 
provinces. See SANDF Documentation Centre, Pretoria: DC, Box 109, files 2270 and 2271 
Defence Council Agenda of 1st and 2nd meetings. See also I. van der Waag, “Smuts’ 
Generals: Towards a First Portrait of the South African High Command, 1912–48”, War in 
History, 18, 1, 2011, pp 33–61. 
31.  NASAP, General C.F. Beyers Collection, Vol. 1, Beyers to Sir John French, 21 July 1913 
(“the melting pot”). There are also numerous references to instances of nepotism and 
“connection” support in J. Kemp to Beyers, 5 April 1909; M.T. Steyn to Beyers, 30 
September 1913;  Smuts to Beyers, 27 February 1914; “Maurits” to Beyers, 8 June 1914 
(all in NASAP, Beyers Collection, vol. 1). See also NASAP, Col M. du Toit Collection, 
W.77.1, in the correspondence between Colonel du Toit and former president M.T. Steyn, 
1912.  
32.  G.D. Scholtz, Generaal Christiaan Federik Beyers 1869–1914 (Voortrekkerpers, 
Johannesburg, 1941); J.C.G. Kemp, Die Pad van die Veroweraar (Nasionale Pers, Cape 
Town 1942); G.D. Scholtz, Hertzog en Smuts en die Britse Ryk (Tafelberg, Cape Town 
1975); L. Jooste, “Die Politieke Koerswending van 1948 Besorg ‘n Nuwe Identiteit aan die 
Univerdedigingsmag”, Militaria, 26, 2, 1996, pp 113–128; L. Jooste, “F.C. Erasmus as 
Minister van Verdediging, 1948–1959”, MA thesis, Unisa, 1995, pp 13–14. 
33.  Wyndham, “Some Aspects of South African Defence”, p 651. 
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Labourite, and representative of force of origin and province.34 Even the specialists 
this select committee interviewed represented the British-colonial and Boer military 
systems in almost perfect equity. A prosopographical study of the South African 
high command during this period shows, moreover, that the split between the 
language groups was exceptionally fine (Table 1). The drive for language equity 
was seemingly the preferred way for finding a consensus in a difficult environment 
characterised by competing military traditions and language preferences.35  
 
Category English Afrikaans 
1912-20 8 11 
1920-30 2 3 
1930-40 4 1 
1940-50 17 15 
Total 31 30 
 
Table 1: Career point and language of South African high command36 
 
 Thirdly, and relating to this matter of equity, was the appointment of the 
high command. This was a difficult political decision and when the various arms of 
the Union Defence Forces came into being in 1913, the whole was placed under a 
divided command to protect sectarian interests and also diminish the possibility of a 
coup. The two most important positions were filled by Lukin, the former commander 
of the Cape Colonial Forces, and the staunchly republican, former-general C.F. 
Beyers. Lukin’s was arguably the more important post in the new structure; he had 
to create an atmosphere in the Permanent Force that was congenial to both 
English and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, which through personal fairness, 
impartiality and professionalism, he achieved to a remarkable degree.37 
 
 Beyers, the commandant general of the Citizen Force, was cut from 
different cloth, which introduces a fourth matter, that of the military factions created 
before 1912 in the struggle for military power and the rush on the available posts in 
the new structures. Beyers and several other high-ranking officers provided 
organisationally for their clients and political followers; Beyers, when head of the 
Citizen Force, even emptying the citizen regiments of their more “British” officers.38 
This, as Charles Leonard complained, worked towards “permanent alienation instead 
of reconciliation”39 and affected the unity of the Union Defence Forces materially. 
Wyndham, pushed out of the Citizen Force in 1912, had noted somewhat 
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109. 
39.  NASAP: Charles Leonard Papers, Charles Leonard to David Graaff, 17 February 1903.  
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prophetically two years earlier that Beyers was “a very violent Boer”, capable of 
making “very racial speeches” and that if he were made “Minister of Defence, or 
Commandant General, [this] would lead to the dismemberment of any defence force 
that we may possess at present or in the future”.40 The establishment of 
organisational fiefdoms stunted development and the UDF failed to employ officers 
with the appropriate military training and education. And then, to complicate the 
complexity of this situation even further, there was the presence of two British 
commands in South Africa, which although a military necessity, was the cause of 
political mischief of a two-way flow, pressing Pretoria to “demonstrate 
independence”. 
 
These local British commands together form a further factor. The British 
Army command headquartered in the Castle, at Cape Town, and the Royal Naval 
base at Simonstown, presented problems that were political and military, 
necessary for the adequate defence of South Africa, but simultaneously a visible 
sign of South Africa’s constitutional and military dependence. South Africa’s 
answer, to invoke one British high commissioner, Sir William Clark, was “to devise 
some difference of method so as to demonstrate South Africa’s independence”.41 
Unsurprisingly, relations between South African officials and their often-shirty, 
British counterparts, were often difficult and reached several nadirs during the First 
World War and then during the 1930s. Smuts and his generals, for example, did 
not bother to consult the commander of the imperial command in South Africa 
when war erupted in 1914, which angered Major General C.W. Thompson and his 
naval counterpart in Simonstown, the commander-in-chief of the Royal Navy’s 
Africa Station. Often Anglo-South African co-operation was a matter of personality. 
Brigadier-General A.E.J. Cavendish was recalled in 1917, after a speech in which 
he described Smuts, then in the British war cabinet, as “that modern miracle” who 
“for (the) beaten enemy ... had a very nasty knack of asserting himself at times”.42 
Imperial distrust of certain South African officers confirmed by the outbreak of 
rebellion in 1914 and Beyers’ Macbeth-like hesitation had exacerbated this. Similar 
friction arose during the build-up to 1939, when the South African government 
seemingly refused to co-operate with the British admiral in Simonstown and in 
1940, much to the chagrin of local RN men, manufactured conditions that enabled 
Pretoria to create her own navy.43 
 
Moreover, the stark economic environment of the 1910s and 1930s and the 
resulting financial austerity, forced Union ministers throughout this period to look to 
South African interests first. However, in terms of military policy the UDF found 
itself caught increasingly between its traditional role of colonial pacification and the 
heightening possibility of a foreign deployment. There was a lack of specificity and 
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Edge of the Wedge: Anglo-South African Relations, Dominion Nationalism and the 
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no clear object; who can forget the reply of former Boer general, Coen Brits, to 
Botha’s request for support in 1914: “My men are ready; who do we fight – the 
English or the Germans?”44 
 
The strategic framework of the period was complex and fraught with 
difficulties, which were at once political, cultural, economic and organisational. 
There was, of course, interplay between individual leaders and their past 
experiences and their approach to military innovation, and the cultural climate of 
the Union’s new military structures. Military leaders and their political masters had 
no consensus on who the potential enemies were, although the services viewed 
the defence of South Africa (possibly a geographic and not solely a political term) 
against a possible landward onslaught as their overall strategic mission. The 
services were always cash-strapped and competed, certainly during interwar 
years, for the shrinking pool of resources. As a result, the UDF enjoyed only 
difficult access to technological resources and there was seldom congruence 
between political objectives and force capabilities. And then, the experiences of 
the 1914–18 war shaped the strategic environment and the preparations for future 
conflict considerably. 
 
Experience of war, 1914–1918 
 
South Africa’s decision to enter the First World War and assist Britain in the 
struggle was not easy. Many Afrikaners recalled the assistance they had received 
from Germany in their recent war against the British and for many, Britain’s claim 
made in 1914 with regard to Belgium that she would protect small nations, seemed 
incredulous.45 Moreover, South Africa was not a united country in 1914. There was 
no South African nation, no consensus on the war. In August and September 
1914, the war suddenly brought the constitutional relationship with Britain and the 
British Empire into sharp relief.46  
 
 In 1914, South Africa, tied constitutionally to Britain, could not choose her 
allies. Besides, nationally, Botha, former Boer general and now wartime prime 
minister, found himself between two camps: a “British” sector, wanting to involve 
South Africa in the war fully, and an Afrikaner camp, wanting South Africa to stay 
out. The first considered it South Africa’s duty, as a loyal dominion of the empire, 
to freely support the British war effort. In fact, during the 1912 defence debate, the 
Unionists had predicted a time when South Africa would not only have to assume 
responsibility for her own defence, so freeing British assets for service elsewhere, 
but also offer the “old country” the support of a South African expeditionary force.47 
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To Afrikaner nationalists this was anathema. M.T. Steyn, writing to Smuts on 31 
July 1914, reckoned that: 
 
the troubles in England are the result of the South African War. One sees still more. 
This war has driven England out of her “splendid isolation” into her “ententes” and 
her yellow alliances and today she has fallen foul of Continental entanglements. The 
mills of Providence grind slowly indeed!48 
  
Republican Afrikaners had longed for this in 1900. Now, fourteen years later, this 
had seemingly happened and there was new hope. The Afrikaner nationalist saw 
no reason whatever to help Britain. They might, as Steyn was suggesting, rather 
seize the moment presented providentially as an occasion for a small people to 
assert their claim for independence, even militarily if necessary. 
 
 Botha, perhaps naively, had hoped to unite the country behind the war 
effort, and so strengthen longer term bonds. This was, as Francey Malan noted, 
“wonderful politics” and Botha succeeded to a surprising degree in quietening the 
voice of radical labour and nationalistic Africans. However, as Malan predicted, by 
committing South Africa to the war, Botha ran “the danger of losing the sentiment 
of the [Afrikaner] people”.49 The war and the questions it opened raised African 
expectations and fuelled Afrikaner nationalism. Botha therefore battled to achieve 
and then maintain consensus in his cabinet. Faced with potential defections and 
the growing rift in Afrikanerdom, his first wartime ministry was unstable and his 
second ministry, formed after the October 1915 election, could only govern with 
Unionist support, though not in formal coalition. 
 
South Africa’s military task was, moreover, complicated. Not only was the 
UDF little more than two years old, but South Africa, as John Buchan reminds us, 
had “foes within and without her gates”50 and her task, “of all the nations of the 
British Commonwealth … [was] at the outbreak of war the most intricate”.51 At the 
beginning of August 1914, South Africa duly offered to take care of her own 
defence, so freeing imperial troops for deployment to France – they were not to 
return.52 The defences of South Africa were now for the first time manned solely by 
the new UDF, some of whom, disliking the tedium of garrison duties and the 
manning of home defences, were anxious to form a South Africa expeditionary 
force. Failing this some left to join the British Army.53 
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 White combatants Coloured 
combatants 
Black labourers
South Africa 5 082  7 267
South West Africa 67 237  33 546
East Africa 43 477  16 845
Egypt and France 30 179 1 925 25 111
In British Army (approx) 
 
6 500  
 
Table 2: Military participation in the First World War54 
 
For the fledgling UDF, her series of complex and divergent campaigns commenced 
with the purpose of neutralising the radio stations in the German colony of South 
West Africa. This campaign was suddenly suspended, while attention was diverted to 
the Afrikaner rebellion. When this was put down, the South West campaign 
recommenced. An infantry brigade helped quash the Senussi in Egypt before being 
practically annihilated at Delville Wood in France. The brigade, accompanied to the 
Western Front by a field ambulance and a general hospital, had to be reconstructed 
more than once. Two brigades of heavy artillery, a signal company, a railway 
company, an Auxiliary Horse Transport Company and a South African Native Labour 
Contingent (SANLC) also served in France, but not in association with each other or 
the infantry brigade. A large South African force broke German resistance in East 
Africa; while a brigade of field artillery and later the Cape Corps served in Egypt and 
Palestine (Table 2). Numerous South Africans were recruited into the Royal Air 
Force; some 6 500 volunteered for service in imperial units; and all the while the 
conquered territory of South West Africa was garrisoned by occupation troops, who, 
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Figure 1: South African casualties (battle related): a comparative campaign 
perspective 
Note: these figures include “killed in action” as well as “wounded in action”. 
 
 For the allied powers, the ostensible victors, victory was bittersweet. For 
South Africa, this was little different. Although the country emerged physically 
unscathed, the price tag, in money and sacrifice, was high.56 The numbers of South 
African casualties were relatively small. Battlefield casualties (killed and wounded 
in action) were particularly low for the African campaigns, numbering 0.56 percent 
of force strength in German South West Africa; 6.92 in Egypt and 7.24 in German 
East Africa. This rose to 25.09 percent for the campaign on the Western Front 
(Figure 1). But this was also low when compared with the other dominions. The 
total killed during the war (1914–1918) was 9 percent of those serving abroad, the 
next lowest was Canada at 12 percent. Most of the 7 121 South African killed 
during the war had died on the Western Front (Table 3). For South Africa, a 
country accustomed to limited wars and low own-force casualties, these losses 
were unacceptable. Furthermore, the war, together with the rebellion and rumour of 
rebellion, had come at a political cost, increasing as it did popular suspicion of 
government, leaders, and institutions like the military. It discredited Botha and Smuts, 
the wartime ministers, and, although temporarily aligning South Africa with the allied 
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Table 3: Contribution of imperial and dominion troops to war effort, 1914-191857 
 This figure is a percentage of the white, male population. 
 
This was, of course, not a phenomenon uniquely South African. Generals, 
across the board, were blamed for the costly failures of the war. Military 
commanders on all sides were criticised and severely so, for the apparent waste of 
human life in a succession of offensives that gained little. Many South Africans 
saw Delville Wood as an example of this callousness. Some like Maud Wyndham, 
the wife of the shadow defence minister, went a step further. She blamed these 
military “muddles” on the Allied generals whom she accused of incompetence and 
lacking in the mental dexterity needed to effect a tactical and strategic 
breakthrough. But she was even more critical of the politicians, who she believed 
were self-serving and did not support the fighting generals with a workable and 
realistic grand strategy to win the war. She was striking an important note: a total 
war demands excellent leadership, political and military, that can work together in 
unison toward larger national objectives. “Providence”, she lamented at the end of 
1915, “has not given us a Chatham and a Marlborough to guide us thro’ this 
period”.58 
 
Yet, although it was “no use girding against the poor minnows we have got”, 
Mrs Wyndham was convinced, as many South Africans were, that “there [were] 
things even a minnow might avoid”.59 The South African leadership, although 
praised in Britain for their stance, was at times, for both the British sector in South 
Africa as well as the Afrikaner right, an object for amusement and of scorn. Some 
soldiers derided the politicians for their apparent willingness “to fight to the last drop 
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Canada 628,964 14 458,218 73 56,63
9 
9 12 
Australia 412,953 14 331,814 80 59,33
0 
14 18 
New Zealand 128,525 20 112,223 87 16,71
1 
13 15 
South Africa 136,070 10  76,184 56 7,121 5 9 










of blood of the soldiers at the front”.60 They, the politicians, were the true enemy; the 
soldiers, collectively, their victims. They were innocent and their sacrifice almost 
Christ-like. Emily Hobhouse blamed the politicians, “who make troubles”, for sending 
the troops in to be killed.61 N.W. Nichol, vocalising a popular sentiment, reckoned 
that “there is no doubt the politicians ought to get it in the neck, it’s an awful shame 
that the soldiers should be the only ones to suffer”.62 They had been exposed to 
the brutality of warfare in Europe supposedly without proper training. There was a 
notion that colonial volunteers ought not to have been thrown into the line against 
German militarism.  
 
Post-war strategic calculations 
 
More than a quarter of a million South Africans served on the different fronts during 
the Great War, involving nearly ten percent of the total white population and some 
twenty percent of the male white population (Table 3). More than thirty thousand 
South Africans experienced the horror of trench warfare on the Western Front, the 
accompanying devastation and the shocking casualty statistics. For South 
Africans, attuned to small wars, limited “native” campaigns, chiefly of pacification, 
and accustomed to low own force casualties, the change to total warfare and the 
experience of the Western Front was cataclysmic. The South African stand at 
Longueval and Delville Wood lasted almost one week, from midday on July 14 to 
dusk on July 20, 1916. This was the most expensive week in South African military 
history until surpassed by the defeat at Sidi Rezeg (1941) and then the surrender 
at Tobruk (1942).63 
 
Nowhere was the impact of the Western Front for South Africa greater than 
on the nation’s foreign policy. The war shattered any possibility for post-rebellion, 
national reconciliation and left South Africans confused and deeply divided on the 
goals to be pursued and methods to be used. Even before it had ended, the 
traumatic experience of the war, combined with the apparent improvement of 
relations between some Afrikaners and some English-South Africans, and a 
growing preoccupation with domestic problems, produced a drastic reordering of 
national priorities. Smuts had placed foreign policy consistently near the top of the 
ranking of national concerns, but by Hertzog’s first term of government it was 
placed well down on the priority list.64 
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In the very different climate of the mid-1920s, the debate over the war that 
had not fully taken place at the war’s end assumed a central place in the larger 
and at times quite vocal debate over South African foreign policy. The basic issues 
remained. Firstly, there was the question of the morality of the intervention. Ought 
South Africa to involve herself in foreign, imperial wars? And, closely associated with 
this, was the aversion for technological warfare, for the materielschacht.65 Smuts 
himself wrote: “There is much to make us profoundly sad and almost to despair of 
the future of the race when we see our greatest intellectual and scientific discoveries 
turned like so many daggers at the heart of civilization.”66 
 
The individual had to be recovered and returned to the centre stage; 
something it seemed that could be done more easily in Africa, where human skill 
seemed to count for more. This raises the second matter, the wisdom of the 
intervention. Europe, simply stated, was not the place for South African military 
ventures. The campaigns in German South West and East Africa had been, as 
Buchan noted, “frontier wars, fought for the immediate defence of her borders and 
her local interests”.67 Sub-Saharan Africa was South Africa’s backyard and the only 
theatre to which post-1924 nationalist governments would consider sending South 
African troops. Warfare in Europe had to be avoided and after 1924 and the advent 
of the first nationalist government, the Union Defence Force refocused on Africa, 
where asymmetry would be to her advantage and was seemingly more suited to the 
South African way of war. France and the Western Front had been geographically 
foreign, and its circumstances militarily unfamiliar.68 
 
Geography and post-Versailles politics had combined to give South Africa 
reasonably safe and defensible borders. The 1922 Smuts-Churchill agreement left 
the Royal Navy responsible for the protection of the coastline and, with 
Simonstown now recognised as a British naval base, all of the reasonable risks of 
war seemed effectively covered. Germany had been driven out of Africa, German 
South West was in South African hands, and Tanganyika had gone to Britain. 
There was now no apparent danger of attack overland and, in any case, the 
overland routes were limited, the potential European enemies geographically 
distant, and African opponents at a technological disadvantage. The Hertzog 
government, which came to power in coalition with Labour in 1924, could as a 
result settle into an easy military economy. 
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Moreover, when in opposition, Hertzog’s National Party had equated military 
and industrial power with Smuts, holism and a Greater Britain.69 The war experience 
had provoked strong Afrikaner opposition, particularly against support of Britain 
and objectives perceived to be British and imperial rather than South African. They 
had opposed South African support for British attempts to rescue Greece and the 
intoxicated Eleftherios Venizelos during the Chanak crisis. Dr D.F. Malan (NP, MP 
Calvinia), noted: “The Dardanelles are not worth a drop of our blood or a shilling of 
our money; South Africa should proclaim her neutrality.”70 Tielman Roos (NP, MP 
Lichtenburg) was quoted as follows: 
 
Ons is absoluut daarteen gekant om die Unie te stoot in die bynes van Europese en 
Asiatiese politiek en oorloë. Dus sal die Nasionale Party veg teen die versending van 
‘n enkele Afrikaner-Engels- of Afrikaans-sprekende – en die uitgawe van ‘n enkele 
pennie in verband daarmee.71  
(We are absolutely opposed to pushing the Union into the beehive of European and 
Asian politics and wars. The National Party will therefore fight against the despatch 
of a single South African and the expense of a single penny in this connection.) 
 
Nationalist politicians followed this line from the start and, after their electoral 
success in 1924, implemented increasingly a policy of neutrality. 
 
There were several constraints, however. For one, there was no common 
vision on who constituted the most likely enemy. The post-war threat assessment 
identified several potential enemies and possible theatres of operations; 
interestingly, the threat perceptions had changed little since the turn of the century. 
There was theoretically, after Germany’s defeat, always a non-African power able 
to project force inter-continentally. During the 1920s this was France. During the 
1930s Italy and Germany were assessed the greater threat. Nationalist politicians, 
and their supporters within the military, reckoned Britain a threat, either as a 
possible foe or as the mechanism through which South Africa would be dragged 
into another war. 
 
There was also the threat of landward invasion from continental Africa, 
which might take the form of a colonial power with imperial objectives or the 
possibility of an African revolt against colonial rule sweeping south, possibly a 
mutiny by the Force Publique of the Belgian Congo.72 Three assumptions underlay 
nationalist policy: there would be time for mobilisation; the war would be mobile 
and in the African bush north of the border and South African cities and towns 
would be safe from air attack.73 The third threat, omnipresent since 1906, was an 
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internal uprising by African nationalists or syndicalised labour within South Africa 
itself. 
 
For the first contingency there was the Royal Navy. But for the second and 
particularly the third contingency, South Africa, they argued, was particularly 
vulnerable. Various measures were taken to buttress the defence force, which had 
been stripped out for reasons of economic efficiency by the nationalist 
governments, and counter strategies to meet each of the three contingencies were 
designed and, by degree, implemented. These measures, sometimes meaningful, 
but often feeble, included increased professionalism in the military; appointments 
based upon military merit rather than political affiliation; the search for alliances; 
and re-equipment. With time three broad principles emerged. Firstly, the zone of 
deployment for the UDF was Africa and the UDF would only be deployed for the 
immediate defence of South Africa, where it would enjoy the advantages of 
technological asymmetry. Here was a further assumption: that the UDF would never 
again have to be deployed to Europe.74 Secondly, the UDF would be a small force, 
well-equipped for its purpose. There would be an emphasis on mounted infantry and 
a small air force, but little room for mechanisation as the lack of infrastructure in 
Africa pointed to little use for it. Thirdly, the UDF would nonetheless be sufficiently 
lethal to deal with internal conflict, sufficiently potent not to run the risk of many own-
force casualties. This is seen at Bulhoek, the Bondelswarts uprising, the Rand revolt 
of 1922, and the Ipumbu uprising of 1931, where the UDF, deployed in three of these 
cases to conduct punitive operations, had great psychological advantage. 
 
The indifference and tendency toward isolation so manifest immediately 
after the war also declined in the following decades as the Nationalists grappled 
with the difficulty of having to marry ideology and reality. The 1930s brought 
several triggers for defence growth and a re-examination of defence policy. The 
first was the creation of the Fusion government in 1933 and the appointment of 
Oswald Pirow as defence minister. Second was the improving economy, that lead 
to Pirow’s five year plans. The third was the Italian occupation of Abyssinia in 1936 
and the sudden realisation that small advances would bring South Africa within air-
striking range of Italian bases. Moreover, there were diplomatic moves by 
Germany to recover her lost colonies and, all the while, the Royal Navy was losing 
ground in the world naval ratings. The strategic landscape had changed suddenly; 
but the UDF, facing no immediate land-based threat, was designed to meet an 
enemy on African soil, somewhere near the equator, and in bush warfare.75 
 
The lack of common vision regarding the threat perception, created 
substantial differences in the other strategic calculations. These considerations, as 
Millett has shown, regard the “anticipated theatres of operations, the immediacy in 
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distance and time from the possible outbreak of war, the balance between 
deterring war or simply preparing to fight it, the likely length of a potential conflict, 
the role of allies”, in South Africa’s case, the role of the United Kingdom as primary 
“ally” and, of course, questions of force design and “the anticipated requirement for 
joint air-sea-land operations”.76 Broadly-speaking, Africa south of the equator was 
considered by the government to be the zone of deployment for a small force that 
had to be sufficiently-lethal, psychologically-overwhelming, and well-equipped. 
 
Technology, military innovation and organisational politics 
 
It was difficult to imagine where such a force would come from, given the constraints 
facing the South African staff. As Captain (later Major General) Frank Theron noted 
in 1930,  
 
the essence of the present-day problem … is … to take what is best and acceptable 
to all in the traditional life and customs of the people, very gradually – for we are a 
most conservative people – to evolve a system that will secure the State against all 
internal trouble, and also raise the most formidable obstacle possible against foreign 
aggression.77 
 
Reformers, often in the face of a general staff and service organisations 
that did not always appreciate the potential of new forms of operations, managed 
to institutionalise new ideas on warfare. This was done through the 
institutionalisation of the study of military history and of the so-called “lessons” of 
the last war in the service schools and colleges, through the writing of doctrinal 
manuals, and through the creation of real operational units. South Africa too went 
through several processes to deduce “lessons”, commencing during the war78 and 
following through a series of military publications produced in South Africa between 
1920 and 1939. These included several drill manuals and textbooks79 as well as the 
official history of the Great War, which appeared in 1924. The last, described later by 
Agar-Hamilton as having “no outstanding merit”,80 was a tremendous disappointment 
to Jack Collyer, a wartime chief of the general staff, who had hoped for a utilitarian 
history that would draw lessons and make instruction material.81 Collyer bridged the 
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Brigade Headquarters, Brig. Gen. H.T. Lukin to Maj. Gen. W. Furse, 3 August 1916, This 
has been quoted at length by Ian Uys in his Rollcall; The Delville Wood Story (Uys 
Publishers, Johannesburg, 1991). 
79.  In 1921 “UDF Infantry Training, Part I (Drill) and Part II (Field Operations)"; “UDF Field 
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80. J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton, “The Union of South Africa War Histories”, in R. Higham (ed.), Official 
Histories; Essays and Bibliographies from around the World (Greenwood, Westport, 1970), p 
443. 
81.  Collyer began his military career with the Cape Mounted Riflemen and saw action in the 
Second Anglo-Boer War as well as the two African campaigns of the First World War. He 
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gap himself with two textbooks, one on the German South West Africa campaign 
(1937) and another on the German East African campaign (1939).82 
 
As far as Collyer was concerned European textbooks were irrelevant in Africa 
and he set about producing standard texts for warfare in Africa, deducing the 
“lessons” in the nineteenth-century utilitarian, didactic fashion, neatly set-out for the 
instruction of officers at the South African Military College.83 Although, many of his 
“lessons” were misinformed, they provide a rare insight into inter-war South African 
military thinking. Collyer, thought by some to be “the Liddell-Hart of South Africa”,84 
pointed out and quite rightly that South Africa had not been prepared for war in 1914 
and his first call was for the systematic collection and updating of information in Sub-
Saharan Africa and “the teaching of experience”, emphasising both the importance of 
military history and the collection of accurate military information. Foreknowledge 
would lessen the difficulty in gaining strategic surprise, shorten campaigning in 
tropical Africa, and so limit casualties. However, Collyer, a mounted infantryman with 
fifty years of service in Africa, was clearly not a man for modern devices. He 
highlighted the problems of air power rather than possibilities85 and discounted the 
immediate value of mechanised transport in Africa, only mounted troops could be 
relied upon, and so provided unwittingly a theoretical basis for the “bush cart” policy 
of Oswald Pirow, who became defence minister in 1933.86 The type of operations 
undertaken by South Africa in East Africa in 1940 and North Africa in 1941 had 
simply not been contemplated. 
 
Britain acquiesced if not quite happily in the political drive by South Africa to 
take care of her own defences, leading to the closure of the imperial command in 
South Africa in 1921 and the establishment of a Seaward Defence Force in 1940. 
At times South African efforts had striking flair. For example, in late 1924, when 
the role of the Active Citizen Force was restricted to the combating of African and 
other uprisings within the Union, a special striking force designated the South African 
Field Force was organised under a single commander. Although small and having 
only a small mechanised nucleus, this force was revolutionary, predating Britain’s 
experimental mechanised force by more than two years.87 The Field Force 
comprised two squadrons of the 1st Regiment, South African Mounted Riflemen and 
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three batteries of the SA Field Artillery;88 with the 1st Regiment SAMR reorganised to 
include an Armoured Car Section of two vehicles (imported from the UK in 1925), 
each with two machine guns.89 This special force could be dispatched at a moment’s 
notice to any location within the country, to deal with disturbances in a quick and 
clinical manner. Yet, as events turned out, in the face of financial stringency and 
louder air voices, the Field Force was disbanded on 31 March 1926.90  
 
There were a number of reasons for this. Airpower had a powerful voice in Sir 
Pierre van Ryneveld, who became CGS in 1933, and airpower seemed to provide a 
potent but cheap means of pacification. In 1922, the Bondelswarts rebellion had 
folded following the deployment of just two aircraft and, three years later, the 
Rehoboth rebellion was put down with the SAAF as the only portion of the UDF 
employed to assist the South West African administration.91 
 
The development of a South African navy faced diverse institutional barriers 
and as a result, naval matters remained neglected through the 1920s and into the 
1930s.92 Defence Headquarters (DHQ) was, after all, first dominated by the army 
and, after 1933, by an increasing number of airmen. British officials, who got to 
know their South African opposite numbers well, thought little of Van Ryneveld. Of 
him Evans, the British admiral, opined: “[he] knows and cares little about the Navy, 
but is a most enthusiastic airman. He will be only too ready to seize on any remark 
about mobility to press for an expansion of the Air Force to the exclusion of all else.” 
Viewed from Simonstown, Major General Andries Brink, an erstwhile CGS and head 
of the commandos in 1939, was thought worse. He was, Evans thought, “no lover of 
England or of the Royal Navy, and he is very cautious where money is concerned. 
He may be expected to support any suggestion for doing as little as possible”.93 
 
In these quotations we see clearly three reasons for the neglect of defence 
and particularly of coastal defence: dominion nationalism, a focus on land and 
after 1933 on air forces, and the impact of the financial stringency of the 1930s. 
Moreover, Van Ryneveld and Brink, who clearly shared views on South African 
force size and force design, dominated the UDF during the 1930s. Their 
mainstreaming an embryo air force, at the cost of coastal defence and of naval 
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forces, is clearly illustrated by the South African nominations (made since 1926) 
for courses in Britain. During this period army officers dominated with 17 courses 
of the total 29. Naval personnel had a brief flash in the early 1930s, when their 
numbers (4) equalled the army candidates during the years 1930–1932. However, 
after 1933 and the advent of the Fusion government and the appointments of 
Pirow as defence minister and of Van Ryneveld as CGS, the picture changed. Of 
the 13 positions filled from 1933 to 1938, more than half were for Van Ryneveld’s 
airmen.94 
 
There was, moreover, an official British perception that South Africans, and 
Oswald Pirow the defence minister from 1933, were reticent to spend money on the 
adequate but unspectacular. Pirow was thought to be  
 
a man of action who likes the big thing and who has little use for half measures. Also, 
he is a great lover and admirer of South Africa and would strongly resent any remark 
which might be interpreted as belittling his country. In addition, he is very air-minded.’95 
 
Increasingly attention was focused and resources spent on the development 
of air power and land and naval matters were increasingly neglected. A redistribution 
of funds and opportunities from the army and naval service to the air force was the 
pattern for the remainder of the interwar period with several defence acquisitions 
contracted with Germany. 
 
While a surprisingly good balance existed, throughout the period, between 
the two language groups (see Table 1), the political elites packed the structures 
with their supporters and, reading popular sentiment, few South Africans in 1914 
and 1939 had full confidence in the skill and political neutrality of the bulk of the 
officer corps. In December 1914, the Archbishop of Cape Town dismissed Sir 
Duncan Mackenzie, who had led the field forces against Bambata in 1906, as 
brave but impetuous, and like the other South African commanders, an amateur 
and “no match for professional German officers”.96 Military advice was not 
institutionalised and military professionalism was not always thought compatible 
with civilian control. At different times, changes were made to the high command – 
in the form of appointments and purges – for political reasons. Purges took place 
on at least five occasions between 1914 and 1948, although on each occasion for 
unique reasons. South Africa entered the Second World War lacking broad-based 
national support. Discontent seethed, particularly in rural districts,97 and in the 
Transvaal several senior officers were charged with “conduct prejudicial to good 
order and military discipline”.98 
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Moreover, the commanders and staff officers had no real knowledge of their 
duties in war. In a controversial book published in 1960, Eric Hartshorn, brigade 
major of the 1st SA Infantry Brigade Group and later commander of the 1st 
Transvaal Scottish, claimed that many of the troops had no confidence in “the 
majority of Senior Regular Officers” at DHQ.99 No senior general staff officers for 
divisions and brigades were named in peace. A careful and deliberate selection of 
the best men, not the politically-reliable, was therefore as vital in 1939 as it had 
been in 1914. Although the question of commands and staffs was all-important, 
the general staff was the chief difficulty. Whereas the general staff officer, as 
Collyer noted, should be a trained soldier and his training is a matter of years, a 
staff course for ACF officers lasted just one month. A staff course for Permanent 
Force officers – abandoned before the war – used to last from 3½ to 4 months and 
courses of this duration for the training of a general staff officer was thought by 
Collyer to be “almost [a] waste of time”.100 
 
 Some South African officers had received training at British institutions, like 
Camberley, Woolwich, Cranwell and Dartmouth. Yet, this too, had little impact. They 
were too few and many were subsequently seconded to the British forces.101 
Nonetheless, there were exceptions. Dan Pienaar (1893–1942) had immense 
prestige and popularity with the rank and file; Harlech, the British high commissioner, 
thought far more of him than any other South African commander and this, 
characteristic of Boer traditions, he thought made the other South African generals 
jealous.102 George Brink (1889–1971), hero of the Abyssinian campaign and 
commander of the 1st Division at Alamein, had attended several arms courses in the 
United Kingdom and lectured gunnery, mapping and tactics at the Military College in 
the 1920s. A classmate of Bernard Montgomery, Bernard Paget and Richard 
O’Connor, he reckoned Camberley to have been of “inestimable value”. Brink, his 
biographer tells us, “was assiduous in assimilating data on military organisation and 
administration. He continued to study on his own. To the end of his life his reading, 
apart from newspapers and periodicals, consisted largely of political and military 
history”.103  
 
At the Military College he influenced the Permanent Force and Active Citizen 
Force officers, from whose ranks the Second World War leadership came. Under his 
guidance, junior officers studied the art of war at the tactical level, while senior 
officers deliberated on the command and logistics of larger formations. 
Commissioned by the pre-war defence minister, Oswald Pirow, Brink went on a 
study visit to Europe in 1937, when he studied the British armed forces, those of 
France and Italy, the potential enemies in Africa, and, above all, Germany. Brink 
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returned brimming with ideas to revitalise the Union Defence Force.104 His zeal and 
progressive spirit is impressive, particularly when seen against the gloomy 
background of the era. No wonder the critical Baston thought Brink “by far the ablest 
soldier at General Headquarters”.105 
 
Yet the greatest hiatus was a broad lack of regimental experience, 
something which the perceptive Baston did not miss. He reported that the UDF 
would be let down by its junior officers, who, he thought, were poorly selected and as 
poorly trained. The selection boards, under the influence of defence secretary 
Broeksma and Colonel Hans van Rensburg, attached primary importance to the 
appointment of Afrikaners and particularly of Afrikaners with a rather anti-British 
background.106 At the same time, promising “British” material was often rejected due 
to the bilingualism requirement, which, he thought, “for one reason or another 
seemed to bear much more heavily on them than on the Afrikaner candidates”.107 
Moreover these young Afrikaner officers were thought to be avowed republicans, still 
permeated by the tradition of individualism, although not quite of the kind that imbued 
the leaders of the old Boer commandos. These youngsters, not exposed to the 
conditions that formed the old leaders, lacked self-control and experience. This was 
confirmed by Collyer.108 
 
Doctrinal development did not keep pace with technological developments 
and the mechanisation of ground forces and the application of new technology 
contrasted sharply with developments in Europe. Although South Africa had the 
industrial capacity for the development of armour and mechanised forces, arguments 
based upon the nature of potential enemy forces, poor infrastructure and terrain 
inaccessibility combined with government policy and financial stringency resulted in 
little being done. Southern Africa, the focus of South African defence policy, was also 
thought to be unfavourable for mechanised warfare. Inadequate roads and 
multifarious geographic features concentrated energy on the development of the air 
arm for operations in Africa and a system of coastal defences to repel a sea assault, 
as well as a mix of British and Boer-type infantry supported by field artillery. As a 
result, an expeditionary force had to be prepared from scratch after September 1939 
and the first South Africans to serve in the Second World War only left the country in 
July 1940. Yet the close relationship between the projected role of the Union 
Defence Force and the low priority given to force maintenance and weapons 
acquisition has been perceived by few writers. 
 
In essence, Smuts’ generals on the eve of the Second World War had little 
education, almost no training, and no experience. Moreover, there was an 
overemphasis on management, essentially the good execution of clerical and desk 
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tasks, together with an over focus on language parity and English-Afrikaans equity 
brought considerable military regression. The transition from a colonial army to a 
modern defence force was therefore not easy, although the South African 
government did make limited post-1918 attempts to adapt to the radically-changed 
face of modern warfare. However, unable to compete militarily with major powers, 
technology was harnessed to make pacification more economic and, for the rest, 
the nationalist governments of the interwar period hoped to remain neutral in terms 
of future global conflict. Nonetheless, the South African staff considered a major 




South Africa experienced three total wars during the first half of the twentieth 
century, which makes her unique. Moreover, through this sequence – the Second 
Anglo-Boer War, the First World War and the Second World War – the totality 
reduced progressively and it was a limited war, a flashpoint of the Cold War, 
fought at the century’s end that changed the country irrevocably. 
 
Nonetheless, the period 1900–1940 witnessed important developments in 
South African military policy. The first of these was structural, involving the 
departure of British armed forces and a decisive shift to a South African monopoly 
of military force within her borders and the consolidation of her apparatus in 
permanent land, air, and sea forces, along with the bureaucratic infrastructure 
necessary to sustain them. This changed both the nature of the defence structure 
and of the conduct of war on the subcontinent itself. Inter-state conflict became 
more distant, while internal conflict became more prevalent, certainly during the 
middle of the period. The Union Defence Force faced outwards against external 
dangers to the colonial state, while internal threats were met by a variety of more 
peaceful tactics, which were well-developed by the second decade of the twentieth 
century. 
 
The political debate for much of this period focused on the distribution of the 
burdens of defence, both across an increasingly-moribund British Empire and 
within the Union of South Africa, where “neutrality” was a rallying call for 
appeasers and pacifists, ever more militant Afrikaner nationalists and indeed 
anybody who bore a grudge against “the British”. Such extraneous influences 
together with a mix of institutional factors brought military and intellectual 
regression between 1918 and 1939, although indeed the UDF through this period 
had the appearance of greater professionalism and assumed an internal 
organisation and forms of behaviour typical of Western counterparts. Yet, like the 
rest of the British Commonwealth, much of the doctrine and tactical innovation had 
not kept pace with technological developments. Training and training facilities were 
inadequate and there was a shortage of uniforms and equipment. The army, despite 
constant undermining by the Afrikaner nationalist press, was still an honoured and 
respectable profession. Promising commanders studied tactics and strategy at the 
SA Military School, and the cream went on to British institutions, in some cases 
not to return. This continued until the final fall of Smuts in 1948 and the 
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establishment of more specialised institutions of military education and training in 
South Africa. By 1945 the UDF displayed state-of-the-art tactics and operational 
originality. They had moved from an emphasis on mounted infantry in 1912 to the 




Based largely on a study of official archives and private papers held in South 
Africa and the United Kingdom, this article sketches the political-strategic 
landscape on which the armed forces of South Africa operated between 1900 and 
1940 and analyses the organisational and extraneous factors that affected their 
functioning and influenced their preparation during peacetime. It explores the 
doctrinal framework, including an assessment of the services’ commitment to the 
problem of doctrine and of their rigour in drawing, learning and implementing the 
so-called “lessons” of the First World War. The South African reaction to the ‘total 
war’ experience of industrialised warfare is discussed and the attempts, apparently 
always feeble, by the South African state to adapt to the changing face of modern 
warfare are explained. It comes with little surprise that the Union Defence Force, 
after the experiences of the Western Front (1916-1918), was still so unprepared 
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Hierdiedie artikel is gebaseer op primêre navorsing uit amptelike argiewe en privaat 
versamelings in beide die Verenigde Koninkryk en Suid-Afrika, en skets die polities-
strategiese landskap waarin die Suid Afrikaanse verdedigingsmagte ontplooi het 
tussen 1900 en 1940. Verder bied die artikel ‘n analise van die samestelling van die 
Unieverdedigingsmag, hul unieke organisasie en ander faktore wat ‘n uitwerking 
gehad het op die verdedigingsmag se voorbereiding gedurende vredestydperke. Die 
sogenaamde ‘lesse’ wat geleer is tydensd Suid-Afrika se deelname aan die Eerste 
Wêreldoorlog, sowel as die gewilligheid om dié lesse in amptelike doktrine te 
implementeer , word ondersoek. Die Suid-Afrikaanse begrip van ‘totale 
oorlogvoering’, en Suid-Afrika se eerste ervaring van oorlogvoering op ‘n industriële 
skaal word ook bespreek. Die halfhartige manier waarop die Suid-Afrikaanse staat 
aangepas het by moderne oorlogvoering gedurende dié typerk word ook bespreek. 
Dus is dit geen wonder dat die Unieverdedigingsmag gedurende 1941, veral na die 
ervaringe op die Westelike Front (1916-1918), steeds grootendeels onvoorbereid 
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